Abstract. There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a prior-7 ity between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts.
only through changes on the superiority (preference) relation. Thus, we believe that 169 our framework is foundational for argumentation of preferences. This means that one 170 can first determine whether the outcome of a discussion can be turned in her favour 171 only changing the superiority relation, and then to figure out which argument (if any) 172 supports the preference.
173
In the current literature about formalisms apt to model normative and legal reason-174 ing, a simple and efficient non-monotonic formalism which has been discussed in the 175 community is Defeasible Logic. This system is described in detail in the next sections.
176
One of the strong aspects of Defeasible Logic is its characterisation in terms of ar-177 gumentation semantics [9] . In other words, it is possible to relate it to general reasoning 178 structure in non-monotonic reasoning which is based on the notion of admissible rea-179 soning chain. An admissible reasoning chain is an argument in favour of a thesis. For 180 these reasons, much research effort has been spent upon Defeasible Logic, and once 181 formulated in a complete way it encompasses other (sceptical) formalisms proposed for 182 legal reasoning [9, 10, 11] .
183
Most interestingly, in Defeasible Logic we can reach positive conclusions as well as 184 negative conclusions, thus it gives understanding to both accept a conclusion as well as 185 reject a conclusion. This is particularly advantageous when trying to address the issues 186 determined by reasoning conflicts.
187
It has been pointed out that the AGM framework for belief revision is not always 188 appropriate for legal reasoning [4] . Moreover, it is not clear how to apply AGM to pref-189 erence revision. Accordingly, this paper provides a comprehensive study of the condi- −∆ : If P(n + 1) = −∆ q then (1) q / ∈ F and (2) ∀r ∈ R s [q]∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆ a ∈ P(1..n).
The proof conditions just given are meant to represent forward chaining of facts and 239 strict rules (+∆ ), and that it is not possible to obtain a conclusion just by using forward 240 chaining of facts and strict rules (−∆ ).
241
The proof conditions for ±∂ are as follows:
242 +∂ : If P(n + 1) = +∂ q then either (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n), or (2) (2.1) −∆ ∼q ∈ P(1..n) and (2.2) ∃r ∈ R sd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂ a ∈ P(1..n) and (2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either (2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) such that −∂ a ∈ P(1..n), or (2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R sd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂ a ∈ P(1..n) and t > s.
−∂ : If P(n + 1) = −∂ q then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) and either (2) (2.1) +∆ ∼q ∈ P(1..n), or (2.2) ∀r ∈ R sd [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂ a ∈ P(1..n) or (2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that (2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂ a ∈ P(1..n) and (2.3.2) ∀t ∈ R sd [q] either ∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂ a ∈ P(1..n), or t > s.
The main idea of the conditions for a defeasible proof (+∂ ) is that there is an ap-243 plicable rule (i.e., a rule where all the antecedents are defeasibly proved) and every rule 244 for the opposite conclusion is either discarded (i.e., one of the antecedents is not defea-245 sibly provable) or defeated by a stronger applicable rule for the conclusion we want to 
256
As usual, given a proof tag #, a literal p and a theory D, we use D ±#p to denote 257 that there is a proof P in D where for some line i, P(i) = ±#p. Alternatively, we say 258 that ±#p holds in D, or simply ±#p holds when the theory is clear from the context.
259
The set of positive and negative conclusion is called extension. 
262
Due to the nature of the revision operators discussed in this paper, the extension 263 does not contain strict conclusions since the only way to modify them is to operate on 264 the set of strict rules (i.e., addition or removal). Similarly, the extension will not include 265 information about the proof tags introduced below. Such proof tags are useful to identify 266 structures in proofs and where to operate in the theory, but they do not specify what is 267 defeasibly provable, or not.
268
The inference mechanism of Defeasible Logic does not allow us to derive inconsis- 
273
In this paper, we do not make use of strict rules, nor defeaters 2 , since every revision 274 changes only the priority among defeasible rules (the only rules that act in our frame-275 work), but we need to introduce eight new types of auxiliary tagged literals, whose 276 meaning is clarified in Example 1. As it will be clear in the remainder, they will be 277 significantly useful in simplifying the categorisation process, and consequently, the re- To improve readability, from now on we use the following graphical notation to repre-281 sent a theory like the previous one: 282 2 The restriction does not result in any loss of generality: (1) the superiority relation does not play any role in proving definite conclusions, and (2) for defeasible conclusions [12] proves that it is always possible to remove (a) strict rules from the superiority relation and (b) defeaters from the theory to obtain an equivalent theory without defeaters and where the strict rules are not involved in the superiority relation. A consequence of this assumption is that the theories we work with in this paper are consistent.
⇒ r 10 e ⇒ r 11 f where the ∧ and ∨ symbols in the graphical representation of a theory are not conjunc-
283
tions and disjunctions but they represent the superiority relation >. In the example, ∨ 284 means that r 1 > r 4 and ∧ that r 5 > r 3 .
285
A conclusion in a defeasible proof can now take one or more of the following forms: means that we could use Modus Ponens (or forward chaining) for deriving +∂ p.
+Σ : If P(n + 1) = +Σ q then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) or (2) ∃r ∈ R sd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r) : +Σ a ∈ P(1..n)
−Σ : If P(n + 1) = −Σ q then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) and (2) ∀r ∈ R sd [q] : ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −Σ a ∈ P(1..n)
The definitions of ±Σ formalise the concept of chain leading to a given literal.
319
With respect of the analysis on how to change a theory by only acting on the supe-320 riority relation, if there does not exist any chain leading to a literal p (i.e., −Σ p holds),
321
then no modification of the theory is possible to prove p.
such that ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂ a ∈ P(1..n) and s > r.
Notice that the definitions given above for ±σ are weak forms of the notion of support
323
proposed in [15, 13] for the definition of an ambiguity propagating variant of Defeasible
324
Logic, in the sense that these definitions are less selective than the ones of [15] .
325
The undefeated chain that allows to state +σ p may be a good candidate for the 326 revision process in order to defeasibly prove p.
327
+ω: If P(n + 1) = +ωq then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) or (2) ∃r ∈ R sd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂ a ∈ P(1..n).
−ω: If P(n + 1) = −ωq then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) and (2) ∀r ∈ R sd [q] : ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂ a ∈ P(1..n).
The chain that allows to state +ω p represents a defeasible proof for p that can only 328 fail on the last derivation step. Thus, possible modifications can focus on this last step 329 instead of considering the whole chain.
330
+ϕ: If P(n + 1) = +ϕq then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) or (2) ∃r ∈ R sd [q] such that (2.1) ∀a ∈ A(r) : +ϕa ∈ P(1..n) and (2.2) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] : ∃a ∈ A(s) such that −Σ a ∈ P(1..n).
−ϕ: If P(n + 1) = −ϕq then (1) +∆ q ∈ P(1..n) and (2) ∀r ∈ R sd [q] : (2.1) ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −ϕa ∈ P(1..n) or (2.2) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that ∀a ∈ A(s) : +Σ a ∈ P(1..n).
The definition of +ϕ ensures that it is not possible to have a counter-argument for a 331 reasoning chain, i.e., a proof, for a literal tagged with it. In particular, we can not have 332 a direct attack, nor an attack to one of its arguments. Therefore, no modification on the 333 superiority relation is possible to reject a literal tagged with +ϕ.
334
Given the above definitions, it is straightforward to derive the implication chains One could be tempted to say that +σ implies +ω (and symmetrically, −ω implies 337 −σ ). This is not the case. Indeed, if we consider theory D of Example 1, we have: (i.) 338 +ωd and −σ d, (ii.) +σ ¬c and −ω¬c.
339
To better explain how the new proof tags behave, we report in Table 1 the set of   340 all conclusions. For each literal, we only report the proof tag which is minimal with 341 respect to the orderings given in Figure 1 . For example, +∂ a means that we prove 342 +ωa, +σ a, +Σ a, but −ϕa. If no tag is reported, then it is not possible to derive the 343 literal with any tags with respect to the ordering given in Figure 1 . 
370
The following result shows that a defeasibly proved literal also implies the provability 371 of all literals it depends on. In other words, the property of dependency given above
372
propagates backwards the defeasible provability of literals. superiority relation > where every rule r : A ⇒ c in C is superior to any rule for ∼c.
423
Thus, theory D = (F, R, > ) is such that D +∂ p.
424
To illustrate why both conditions of Proposition 9 are required to guarantee that the 425 canonical case whose outcome is +∂ p after the revision operation, let us consider a 426 theory with the following rules:
In this case we have both +Σ a and +Σ ¬a, therefore we can build a reasoning chain to 428 p, but p itself is ∂ -unreachable because it depends on a contradiction. Thus, there is no 429 way to change the previous theory to prove p.
430
We end this section proposing an example to translate a real-life case into our logic. This 
441
The couple is indeed able to produce embryos and they cannot be considered as 
479
The notion of >-R-irrefutable represents the negative counterpart of >-R-tautological; 480 the same holds for >-R-refutable and >-R-non-tautological.
481
If p is >-R-tautological, then, in every theory based on the set of rules R, an instance 482 of the superiority relation such that p is defeasibly refuted does not exist. Accordingly,
483
if a literal is >-R-tautological, then we cannot revise it.
484
On the contrary, if an instance of the superiority relation where p is no longer prov-485 able exists, then p is >-R-refutable.
486
To prove the NP-completeness of the problem of establishing if it is possible to revise a 487 theory modifying only the superiority relation, we reduce the 3-SAT problem -a known
488
NP-complete problem -to our decision problem. In particular, we are going to map a The above definition clearly shows that the mapping is polynomial in the number of 492 literals appearing in the 3-SAT formula Γ .
493
The second step of the proof construction is to ensure that the proposed mapping 
507
Proof. It is easy to verify by case inspection that the atom dependency graph is acyclic.
508
We are now ready to introduce the main result of NP-completeness. First of all, we 509 have to prove that the revision problem is in NP. Second, we show that it is NP-hard To prove the NP-hardness, given a 3-SAT formula Γ = and a literal p in D, we show that: Thus, for each i, there exists j such that I a i j .
528
We build a defeasible theory D = ( / 0, R Γ , > ) as follows. If there exists a literal b l +∂ a i j .
540
We build an interpretation I as follows:
Since for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have I(a i j ) = 1 for at least one j, then also I C i for all i, 543 and we conclude that I Γ .
544
In addition, Theorem 16 specifies that there are situations where it is not possible to 545 revise a literal only using the superiority relation. For example, if we take a 3-SAT 546 formula which is a tautology, the Γ -transformation generates a theory that cannot be 547 revised only using the superiority relation. Thus, we can formulate the following result. 
Revision in Legal Domain

585
Notice that literals provable with tag +ϕ are special cases of tautological literals (cf. 
594
Proof.
(1) Given any theory, to obtain a defeasible proof of a literal q, there must exist 595 at least one reasoning chain supporting q, i.e., +Σ q must hold. This is in contradiction 596 with Proposition 3 which states that if +ϕ∼q holds, also −Σ q does.
597
(2) By definition of +ϕ p, there exists a reasoning chain that defeasibly proves p 598 made of elements such that there does not exist any rule for the opposite conclusion.
599
Thus, no attack to this chain is possible, and condition (2.3.1) of +∂ always holds for 600 each element of this chain (we recall that −Σ l implies −∂ l for any literal l).
601
In the rest of the section we are going to describe three types of revision of prefer-
602
ences. For each case we identify the conditions under which such revisions are possible.
603
Therefore, all revision cases studied below will not consider tautological literals as well 604 as ∂ -unreachable literals, assuming that the underlying theories are consistent.
605
Given a defeasible theory D a literal p can be proved (i.e., +∂ p) or refuted (i.e.,
606
−∂ p). we cannot operate on them. Given −ϕ p, there exists at least one of its premises that 632 could be defeated by a rule leading to the opposite conclusion. Thus, in order to obtain 633 −∂ p, we have to revise the theory allowing at least one of such rules to be able to fire 634 (to defeat, or at least to have the same power of a rule which actually proves one of the 635 antecedents in the chain supporting p).
636
Instance +ω∼p ∧ +σ ∼p: as stated in Proposition 4, this branch represents an impos-637 sible case for any consistent defeasible theory.
638
Instance +ω∼p ∧ −σ ∼p: by the straightforward implication of Proposition 4, the 639 chain supporting ∼p fails on the last proof step, defeated by priorities for rules which 640 defeasibly prove p. Thus, we have only to erase these priorities.
Instance −ω∼p ∧ +σ ∼p: since a chain P ∼p exists, and is never defeated (condition −ω∼p only illustrates that such a chain fails before the last proof step), a revision 643 process does not have to operate on a chain supporting p. We have to strengthen P ∼p by 644 changing many priorities in order to let a rule in P ∼p obtain at least the same strength
645
of such a rule in P p . In this process, we do not remove any priority among elements in 646 P p , but only add priorities to let a rule in P ∼p win.
647
Instance −ω∼p ∧ −σ ∼p: the reasoning chain P ∼p supporting ∼p is defeated, but 648 not necessarily by a chain P p proving p. The case is analogous to the aforementioned 649 instance, but (1) we probably have to act not only on P ∼p , but also on P p , and (2) By following the cases depicted in Figure 2 , we explain how a revision operator should 655 work by changing the root label to "+∂ p to +∂ ∼p" and starting from the same premises
656
(−ϕ p ∧ +Σ ∼p). Once more, our revision tree does not take into account tags ±ϕ for 657 the same reasons explained at the beginning of Section 4.
658
Instance +ω∼p ∧ +σ ∼p: as stated in Proposition 4 this branch represents an impos-659 sible case for any consistent defeasible theory.
660
Instance +ω∼p∧−σ ∼p: Proposition 4 states that the chain supporting ∼p is defeated 661 on the last proof step. This, combined with −σ ∼p, implies that the last step is defeated 662 by a priority for the rule which defeasibly proves p. In fact, there may exist more than 663 one defeated chain for ∼p on the last step, as well as more than one chain which proves 664 p. We propose two different approaches. We name P the set of chains defeasibly proving 665 p, P ls ⊆ P the set of chains that defeasibly prove p for which there is a priority that 666 applies at the last proof step (against a chain that proves ∼p), and N the set of chains 667 for which the premises hold:
We choose a chain in N. We invert the priority for every chain in P ls that wins at the 669 last proof step. We introduce a new priority for making it win against any remaining 670 chain in P.
671
2. In this approach we have two neatly distinguished cases:
672
(a) |P ls | > |N|: for every chain in N we invert the priorities on the last proof step.
673
For every remaining chain in P, we add a priority between the defeasible rule 674 used in the last proof step of a chain in N and the rule used in the last proof in P that defeasibly prove p, we go on with the method used for the case 2(a),
680
focusing on the subset of chains in N modified during the first step. 
692
Let us consider the following example:
If the chain for ¬p with rule r 4 is chosen as the winning chain, the first approach 694 would give {r 1 > r 3 , r 4 > r 1 , r 4 > r 2 } as an output, erasing one priority and introducing 695 two, while the second approach would generate the following priority set: {r 3 > r 1 , r 4 > 696 r 2 }, erasing two priorities, and introducing two. If a new rule r i defeats r 4 , it is easy to 697 see that in the first case we have to entirely revise the theory (for example, let r 3 win 698 against r 1 and r 2 ), while in the second case we have only to introduce r 3 > r 2 .
699
Instance −ω∼p ∧ +σ ∼p: there exists an undefeated chain supporting ∼p. To revise 700 the theory, we have to choose one of them and, starting from ∼p, go back in the chain 701 to the ambiguity point (where P(i) = +∂ p i ∧ P(i + 1) = −∂ p i+1 holds), and strengthen 702 the chain by adding a priority where a rule leading to an antecedent in the chain for ∼p 703 and a rule for the opposite have the same strength.
704
Instance −ω∼p ∧ −σ ∼p: every chain supporting ∼p is defeated at least one time.
705
A plausible solution could be to go back in the chain searching for the point where 706 P(i) = +σ p i and P(i + 1) = −σ p i+1 . But this is not enough to guarantee the chain to 707 win. Let us consider the following example.
708
Example 3. Let D be a theory having the following rules:
It is easy to see that the sole condition of r 3 winning over r 6 is not sufficient: we have 710 also to introduce a priority between r 1 and r 5 . Thus, we have to act exactly as in the 711 aforementioned case, with the solely difference that every time a rule in the chain sup-712 porting ∼p is defeated, the priority rule has to be inverted. 719 the case, we would have either +ω p, or +∂ ∼p, which are both against the hypothesis.
724
Instance +ω p∧+σ p: we choose one of the chains where condition +ω p∧+σ p holds,
725
and introduce as many priorities as the number of chains where +ω∼p holds.
726
Instance −ω p ∧ +σ p: this case is analogous to instance −ω∼p ∧ +σ ∼p of canonical 727 case from +∂ p to +∂ ∼p.
728
Instance −ω p ∧ −σ p: this case is analogous to instance −ω∼p ∧ −σ ∼p of canonical 729 case from +∂ p to +∂ ∼p.
731
We remark that conditions ±σ ∼p are not useful for the revision process, since they do 732 not give information whether the changes will affect chains for ∼p, or not. Example 4
733
shows that, even if +σ ¬p holds, two distinct revisions exist: the first involves the chain 734 for ¬p (introducing r 1 > r 3 ), the second does not (introducing r 5 > r 6 ).
735
Example 4. Let D be a theory having the following rules:
An analogous situation is proposed for −σ ∼p in Example 5.
Example 5. Let D be a theory having the following rules:
In here, two revisions exist: one introducing r 1 > r 3 , and the other one which introduces 739 r 7 > r 9 .
740
Notice that in all the canonical cases, the revision mechanism guarantees that no cycle 741 can be introduced. We can formulate this result, which is a straightforward consequence 742 of the case analysis presented here.
743
Theorem 19 Revising a superiority relation generates a superiority relation. In the remainder we assume that the reader is familiar with the terminology used in 763 the AGM framework, in particular with the notions of belief, belief set, and theory 5 .
764
To adjust the AGM framework in the perspective of preference revision, we first 765 rephrase the concept of extension into that of belief set corresponding to a defeasible 766 theory.
767
5 Notice that in our framework the hypothesis of completeness of a theory does not hold in general, as it could be the case that in a defeasible theory neither +∂ p, nor +∂ ∼p is derivable.
is We also state that when a literal p is believed,
tuitively, the idea is that if we prove +∂ p then we believe in p, and if we prove −∂ p 772 then we do not believe in p.
773
In the remainder of the section, we relate the AGM operators of contraction, expansion, 
776
Belief contraction is the process of rationally removing from a belief set K a certain 
784
Belief revision is the process of rationally deleting a certain belief ψ from a belief 
Preference contraction
804
Throughout this subsection, we assume that D +∂ p for a literal p in D.
805
The first postulate in AGM belief contraction states that when a belief set is contracted by a sentence p, the outcome should be logically closed. In Defeasible Logic, we distinguish between a theory (i.e., a set of rules), and its extension (i.e., its set of conclusions). In general, given an extension in Defeasible Logic, there are multiple (possibly not equivalent) theories that generate the extension. This means that in AGM there is no difference to contract a theory or its base, while it is not the case in Defeasible Logic.
As preference contraction acts only on the superiority relation, to ensure that a con- is an element of > and the cycle in > is also in >, against the hypothesis.
814
The idea of the second AGM postulate for belief contraction is that a contraction removes beliefs, thus a contraction operation always produces a belief set smaller than the original. AGM focuses only on "positive" beliefs. However, in our framework we have two possible types of defeasible conclusions (as it turns out also by Definition 20), thus we have to check the relationships between the elements of the defeasible belief sets before and after the operation. In particular, since we remove a belief, then the set of formulae believed should be smaller after the contraction; this also means that the set of formulae we do not believe is increased by the formula we contract. As a consequence, the second postulate must be rewritten taking into account the two parts.
This postulate cannot be adopted in our framework because it contradicts the sceptical 815 non-monotonic nature of Defeasible Logic. To see this, suppose that we know a and we 816 have the rules ⇒ p and a ⇒ ¬p. Then a is sceptically provable, and p is not. But if we 817 decide to contract a, then p becomes defeasibly provable, thus we have
Notice that this behaviour is not confined to the specifics of Defeasible
819
Logic, but holds in any sceptical non-monotonic formalism.
820
The third postulate of AGM considers the case when a belief ψ is not in the initial belief set. As we have already discussed, AGM focuses on a classical notion of consequence relation, thus if ψ is not a consequence of the theory, then there is no reason to change anything at all. In Defeasible Logic, this corresponds to not being able to prove p. Accordingly, we can state that p ∈ BS −∂ (D).
Since we want to obtain a theory where −∂ p holds and by hypothesis p ∈ BS −∂ (D), 821 then the postulate trivially holds.
822
The fourth AGM postulate states that the only literals that are immutable in the contraction process are tautologies. Defeasible Logic does not have logical connectives, thus it is not possible to have tautologies in the classical sense. Nevertheless, the concept of tautology is that of a statement that cannot ever be refuted, i.e., it is true in every interpretation. In classical logic, an interpretation is an assignment of truth values to the propositional atoms, while in Defeasible Logic corresponds to consider a particular set of propositional atoms as factual knowledge. In the context of this paper, where we assume that the set of facts cannot be changed, the closest thing to an interpretation is an assignment of the superiority relation. We give the formulation of the success postulate for contraction using the contrapositive.
The concept of strict derivation embodied by +∆ cannot fully capture the notion of tau- 7 In general, making a literal p no longer defeasibly provable does not imply that −∂ p holds after the revision process. For example, consider the theory ⇒ r p and ¬p ⇒ s ¬p. The only way to prevent +∂ p is to impose s > r, but in the resulting theory none of +∂ p and −∂ p holds (same for ¬p). Notice that in this case the conditions for our canonical cases to succeed do not hold.
⇒
To contract p, we must block derivations of +∂ a, +∂ b and +∂ c. This can be ob-842 tained by adding the following tuples to the superiority relation: (r 7 , r 9 ), (r 11 , r 13 ) and
843
(r 15 , r 17 ).
844
Example 8.
To contract p, we must now block derivations also of +∂ e, and +∂ f . Derivation of e 845 can be blocked only if we prove the antecedent of r 23 , that is n (the derivation of c is 846 blocked as well). This implies that the derivation of f is blocked only if +∂ ¬m holds
847
(the only antecedent of rule r 25 ). We can now operate only on the provability of either 848 l, or ¬l. In both cases, one between a or b cannot be refuted.
849
In Subsection 4.1 we have shown that, in general, revising a defeasible theory using 850 only the superiority relation is an NP-complete problem. This suggests that there might 851 not be a simple condition, based on proof tags, that can be computed in polynomial time 852 and also guarantees a successful contraction.
The fifth AGM postulate states that contracting, and then expanding by the same belief ψ will give back at least the initial theory.
This postulate cannot be adopted since, once the contracted theory has been obtained, containing the preference r 4 > r 6 is another valid solution.
860
Nevertheless, if all operations in the contraction process can be traced, then we can 861 easily backtrack and obtain the initial theory, satisfying the postulate.
862
The sixth AGM postulate, also known as the postulate of the irrelevancy of syntax, states that if two beliefs ψ and χ are logically equivalent, then contracting by ψ and contracting by χ produce the same result.
In the framework of Defeasible Logic, the language is restricted to literals, thus two 
865
The seventh and the eighth postulate are best understood if seen in combination. They essentially relate two individual contractions with respect to a pair of sentences ψ and χ, with the contraction of their conjunction ψ ∧ χ. As already stated, in Defeasible Logic there are no logical connectives, and a conjunction of literals is equivalent to the set of the same literals; the same reasoning used to introduce postulate (K−2) applies here. Thus, the two postulates can be rewritten as
Postulates (K−7) and (K−8) do not hold for the same reason formulated for postulate
866
(K−2). The following example shows the truth of the statement for both of them.
In this theory, we have BS +∂ (D) = {a, b, c, d, ¬p}, and BS −∂ (D) = {¬a, ¬b, ¬c, ¬d, p}. respect to the changes in the superiority relation) obtaining:
The respectively intersections are:
We can now contract a and b simultaneously, and obtain
proving our claim. The first AGM postulate for revision states that the revision process has to preserve the logical closure of the initial theory.
The reasoning is the same made for the first postulate for contraction and expansion, 885 and it assures that also (K * 1) is satisfied in our framework.
886
The second AGM postulate for revision captures the most general interpretation of theory change; the new information ψ is always included in the new belief set, even if ψ is self-inconsistent, or contradicts some belief of the initial theory. Henceforth, the complete reliability of the new information is always assumed.
As by definition of our second canonical case, literal p is forced to be defeasibly proved 887 after the process, provided that preconditions +∂ ∼p and +Σ p hold, the postulate is 888 clearly satisfied.
889
The third and the fourth postulates of AGM revision explain the relationship between the revision and the expansion processes. The quintessential meaning is that they are independent by operators implementing them.
Both the first two canonical cases, starting from an initial theory and considering a 890 literal p, operate to obtain a final theory where +∂ p holds. What we have to care about, 891 however, are the preconditions for which these two canonical cases apply. The third 892 postulate essentially states that every belief which can be derived revising a theory 893 by a belief ψ can be also obtained expanding the same initial theory with respect to 894 the same belief. This statement is perfectly allowed in our framework; the case where 895 both revision and expansion can apply is when +∂ ∼p (and hence −∂ p) holds in the 896 initial theory; in this situation, the two processes behave in the same manner, i.e., they 897 calculates the same extensions. However, if we regard at proper expansion, i.e., when 898 condition −∂ ∼p holds, then it is easy to see that the preconditions for expansion and 899 revision are mutually exclusive and can not be applied at the same time.
900
The fifth AGM postulate states that the result of a revision by a belief ψ is the absurd belief set iff the new information is in itself inconsistent.
Since by definition a literal p is always consistent, and the extension of a consistent 901 theory is also consistent, the postulate is trivially satisfied.
The sixth AGM postulate for revision follows the same idea of (K−6): the syntax of the new information has no effect on the revision process, all that matters is its content. Again, it has a natural counterpart in Defeasible Logic.
The reasoning is the same exploited in the counterpart postulate for contraction, and the 903 postulate is straightforward.
904
The seventh and the eight postulate of AGM revision cope with the revision process with respect to conjunctions of literals. In the classical AGM framework, the principle of minimal change takes an important role in the formulation of these postulates. The revision with both ψ and χ should correspond to a revision of the theory with ψ followed by an expansion by χ, provided that χ does not contradict the beliefs in the theory revised by ψ.
Again, since the sceptical nature of Defeasible Logic, these postulates cannot be satis-
905
fied. The following example gives a specific case that falsifies them.
906
Example 11. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules: is not empty, but neither theory is contained in the other.
Preference expansion
D −∂ ∼p. Moreover, +Σ p holds.
921
The first AGM postulate for expansion states that if a theory is expanded with a belief ψ, then the resulting theory is the logical closure of the initial theory.
The same idea for postulate (K−1) can be exploited, thus the postulate is clearly satis-922 fied.
923
The second AGM postulate for expansion assures that a belief ψ for which the expansion is performed always belongs to the belief set of the resulting theory.
By the hypotheses given at the beginning of this subsection, the postulate trivially holds 924 since the expansion process forces literal p to be defeasibly proved.
925
The joint formulation of the third and the fourth AGM postulates for expansion states that if a belief is already present in the initial belief set, then an expansion process lets the theory unchanged.
Since we aim at obtaining a theory where +∂ p holds, and by hypothesis p ∈ BS +∂ (T ), 926 the postulates seen together trivially hold given that, by definition, its premise does not 927 hold.
928
The fifth AGM postulate states that if a belief set is contained in another one, then the expansion of both sets wrt the same belief preserves the relation of inclusion.
Also in this case, because of the sceptical non-monotonic nature of Defeasible Logic, Non-monotonic formalisms derive conclusions that are tagged. The specific nature of this tagging is that it makes the notion of minimality for a set of conclusions useless. We can consider minimality only for one given tag, and not for all tags (this is particularly obvious for formalisms where tags of formulae are interdependently defined). Thus, the idea of "smallest resulting set" is meaningless in non-monotonic systems. The sixth AGM postulate assures the minimality of the expanded belief set.
Given a theory D and a belief p, BS(D + p ) is the smallest belief set satisfying (K + 1) − (K + 5).
(K + 6)
In the perspective of non-monotonic reasoning, the operation of expanding a defeasible 932 theory to prove a literal p (only changing the preference relation) necessarily falsifies 933 some other literals, previously provable in the initial theory. 
Preference identities
935
In AGM framework a process that defines revision in terms of expansion is available, suggested by Isaac Levi [19] . The idea is that to revise a theory D by a belief ψ we may firstly contract D by ¬ψ in order to remove any information that may contradict ψ, and then expand the resulting theory with ψ. This is know as the Levi identity, which can be rewritten using our terminology as:
The following example shows that the Levi identity does not hold in our framework.
936
Example 12. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules: are not necessarily the 'opposite' of those for contraction.
946
As Levi Identity relates the revision process in terms of expansion, Harper proposed a method to obtain the contraction using revision [20] ; the underlying idea is that a theory D contracted by a belief ψ is equivalent to the theory containing only the information that remain unchanged during the process of revising D by ¬ψ. In our terms, the Harper Identity can be rewritten as
Harper Identity does not hold for the operations we defined in this paper. Example 13 quences of a given formula.
958
In this section we have provided an interpretation of the AGM postulates for expan-959 sion, contraction and revision in terms of our canonical cases and the operations that 960 are possible when the changes operate only on the superiority relation.
961
We believe that the contribution of this section is multi-fold. First of all, the defini- Logic, and it is unreasonable to expect that they hold for non-monotonic reasoning in 968 general.
969
6 Related Work
970
As far as we are aware of, the work most closely related to ours is that of [21] where the 971 authors study, given a theory, how to abduct preference relation to support the derivation 972 of a specific conclusion. Therefore the problem they address is conceptually different 973 from what we presented in this paper, given that we focus on modifying the superiority 974 relation.
975
Notice that in non-monotonic reasoning, a revision is not necessarily triggered by 976 inconsistencies. [2] investigates revision for Defeasible Logic and relationships with 977 AGM postulates. While their ultimate aim is similar to that of the present paper -i.e.,
978
8 Notice that while the main analysis in this paper is specific to revision of the superiority relation of Defeasible Logic, the definition of the canonical cases does not depend on it, and it can be applied in a much broader context. For example the canonical case from +∂ p to +∂ ¬p can be understood as "how do we modify a theory such that before the revision a formula holds, and after the revision the opposite holds?"; similarly for the other canonical cases.
transforming a theory to make a previously provable (resp. non provable) statement, ilarly, they show that it is possible to revise theories fully satisfying the AGM postulates, posed in this work can be easily accommodated to join the framework presented in periority relation is dynamically derived from arguments and rules in given theories.
same. For example, in [29] , it is possible to have rules of the form r : a ⇒ (s > t) where Therefore, we presented in Section 3 the formalism adopted: eight different types of tagged literals were described to simplify the categorisation process and, consequently, 1067 the revision calculus. In Section 4, we introduced three canonical cases of possible respect to the conclusions derived from a theory. A few research questions naturally fol-low: 'Are there conditions on a theory to guarantee that a revision is minimal?', or 'Is it 1107 possible to compare different minimality criteria?'.
1108
We illustrate some of these issue with the help of the following example.
1109
Example 15. Let D be the following theory
1110
⇒ other cases where we cannot guarantee the success of the revision operation. On the 1122 other hand, [2] argues that the success postulate for revision holds if we are allowed to 1123 operate on rules instead of preferences. This example suggests that it might possible to 1124 find a set of postulates, but this would specific to a logic and specific types of operations.
1125
The quest for an alternative set of postulates for revision of non-monotonic theories is 1126 left for future research. 
